The State Comptroller recently completed its latest report on how the defense establishment handles the development of weapon systems intended for active defense against rockets and short-range missiles. The report was presented to the Knesset's State Control Committee, the prime minister, the defense minister and to senior defense officials. It seems the report uses harsh language, uncovering several shortcomings in the Defense Ministry's process of deciding on which system to develop and why, to which military industry to grant the rights of development, and why one company should be preferred over another. The report's subjects now have four months to respond to the criticism leveled against them.
The report allows for a rare look at the close connections, sometimes reminiscent of a revolving-door policy, between Defense Ministry officials and those Israel Defense Forces officers involved in the processes of weapons' development, production and acquisition. And so it can happen that one day you are an IDF officer coordinating with the military industries, and the following day you get a job in that very same industry or in the Defense Ministry itself.
One of the report's sections deals with the ministry's controversial decision to allocate to Rafael Advanced Defense Systems a budget of almost one billion shekels to develop the "Iron Dome" system, which is supposed to protect against short-range rockets like Qassams and Katyushas. It is already clear that Iron Dome will not be ready by the date promised by then-defense minister Amir Peretz, and his successor, Ehud Barak. In addition, and contrary to what was promised, the system will not be able to contend with mortar shells. In any case, even if Iron Dome is operationable in two years' time - which is extremely doubtful - Sderot and the communities bordering the Gaza Strip will remain exposed to Qassams and to mortar rockets in the interim.
The report allows for a rare look at the close connections, sometimes reminiscent of a revolving-door policy, between Defense Ministry officials and those Israel Defense Forces officers involved in the processes of weapons' development, production and acquisition. And so it can happen that one day you are an IDF officer coordinating with the military industries, and the following day you get a job in that very same industry or in the Defense Ministry itself.
One of the report's sections deals with the ministry's controversial decision to allocate to Rafael Advanced Defense Systems a budget of almost one billion shekels to develop the "Iron Dome" system, which is supposed to protect against short-range rockets like Qassams and Katyushas. It is already clear that Iron Dome will not be ready by the date promised by then-defense minister Amir Peretz, and his successor, Ehud Barak. In addition, and contrary to what was promised, the system will not be able to contend with mortar shells. In any case, even if Iron Dome is operationable in two years' time - which is extremely doubtful - Sderot and the communities bordering the Gaza Strip will remain exposed to Qassams and to mortar rockets in the interim.
Solutions kept in storage
The comptroller's report also touches on the Defense Ministry's motives in not deploying a defense system in Sderot and the communities located in areas bordering on Gaza, leaving the residents without an active defense system until Iron Dome becomes operationable. This, although there are in fact systems that have proven themselves, including the Nautilus laser cannon and the Vulcan cannons as well as the Phalanx Close-In Weapons System, which could have provided a temporary, albeit partial solution to the problem until the Iron Dome's completion.
It was possible to get a taste of this faulty policy, adopted by the ministry and the IDF, at a seminar held two weeks ago in Herzliya, whose participants included four former commanders of the anti-aircraft alignment attached to the Israel Air Force. They pointed out that it would have been possible as early as several years ago to defend Sderot and the surrounding communities in the Negev. One option would have been to deploy several batteries of Vulcan Cannons with radar, they said, which would be capable of identifying targets at a short range of several kilometers, calculate the shell or Qassam's expected trajectory and launch 20 mm shells against them at rapid fire rate. The Vulcan was originally developed as a defense system for naval vessels, but for the past three years, Raytheon has been producing a land version as well.
Vulcan Cannons are currently deployed in Iraq, where they defend the Green Zone, Baghdad's urban center, which is considered the "beating heart" of the American command and the Iraqi administration - an area that is immeasurably larger than Sderot.
According to some of the speakers at the gathering in Herzliya, one only has to bring a number of such cannons to Israel and deploy them in the Negev - at the relatively high cost of some $15 million for every pair of cannons. According to Brig. Gen. Yair Dori, who commanded the IDF's anti-aircraft division in the years 2003-2004, even that is not necessary. There are currently 48 such cannons in IDF storage facilities, together with spare parts and ammunition; they have been taken out of operative use. "All that is necessary is to make them operable and deploy them," he says. In a conversation with Haaretz, Dori said that back in 2001, when the Qassams were first fired, the army's anti-aircraft alignment deployed a number of these cannons on the fence with the Gaza Strip, next to the Erez border crossing. "After half a year, for some reason, it was decided that the deployment should be canceled," Dori related.
Both Dori and Brig. Gen. Eitan Yariv, who headed the anti-aircraft division in the 1980s, believe that three or four Vulcan batteries would provide reasonable protection for Sderot. But Defense Ministry officials refuse to even hear about that. Dr. Avi Weinrib, who was the Defense Ministry coordinator responsible for the development of missiles and rockets, and who also spoke at the seminar, insisted that some 25 batteries would be necessary for defense. But the truth is that this is not the problem of the officials at the Defense Ministry - rather it is the responsibility of Barak, of Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, and of air force Commander Ido Nehushtan.
In order to deploy batteries for Sderot's defense, the IAF top brass would have to define this as an "operative demand." That has not happened, a failure Dori blames on the lack of attention paid by the IAF commander to anyone who is not a pilot and anything that is not an aircraft. In other words, the anti-aircraft batteries and the defense of Sderot are not exactly at the top of the air force commander's list of priorities. The one individual who should be able to see the entire picture and promote a change is Defense Minister Barak.
Two months ago there was a sense that Barak had finally seen the light and understood that there was a ready solution to the problem of defending Sderot and the Negev - that he had realized that he had been taken on a wild goose chase. All he needs to do is instruct the chief of staff and the air force commander to define the area's defense as "an operative need." Back then, Barak promised close aides that during his visit to Washington, he would discuss the possibility of bringing at least one Vulcan system to Israel, to examine its capabilities.
But it turns out that talk is one thing, and deeds, another. For now, the residents of Sderot and the Negev communities, currently enjoying the calm bestowed by the cease-fire with Hamas, will continue to be the victims of indecision, bureaucracy, and considerations that seem to be based on conflicts of interest.
It was possible to get a taste of this faulty policy, adopted by the ministry and the IDF, at a seminar held two weeks ago in Herzliya, whose participants included four former commanders of the anti-aircraft alignment attached to the Israel Air Force. They pointed out that it would have been possible as early as several years ago to defend Sderot and the surrounding communities in the Negev. One option would have been to deploy several batteries of Vulcan Cannons with radar, they said, which would be capable of identifying targets at a short range of several kilometers, calculate the shell or Qassam's expected trajectory and launch 20 mm shells against them at rapid fire rate. The Vulcan was originally developed as a defense system for naval vessels, but for the past three years, Raytheon has been producing a land version as well.
Vulcan Cannons are currently deployed in Iraq, where they defend the Green Zone, Baghdad's urban center, which is considered the "beating heart" of the American command and the Iraqi administration - an area that is immeasurably larger than Sderot.
According to some of the speakers at the gathering in Herzliya, one only has to bring a number of such cannons to Israel and deploy them in the Negev - at the relatively high cost of some $15 million for every pair of cannons. According to Brig. Gen. Yair Dori, who commanded the IDF's anti-aircraft division in the years 2003-2004, even that is not necessary. There are currently 48 such cannons in IDF storage facilities, together with spare parts and ammunition; they have been taken out of operative use. "All that is necessary is to make them operable and deploy them," he says. In a conversation with Haaretz, Dori said that back in 2001, when the Qassams were first fired, the army's anti-aircraft alignment deployed a number of these cannons on the fence with the Gaza Strip, next to the Erez border crossing. "After half a year, for some reason, it was decided that the deployment should be canceled," Dori related.
Both Dori and Brig. Gen. Eitan Yariv, who headed the anti-aircraft division in the 1980s, believe that three or four Vulcan batteries would provide reasonable protection for Sderot. But Defense Ministry officials refuse to even hear about that. Dr. Avi Weinrib, who was the Defense Ministry coordinator responsible for the development of missiles and rockets, and who also spoke at the seminar, insisted that some 25 batteries would be necessary for defense. But the truth is that this is not the problem of the officials at the Defense Ministry - rather it is the responsibility of Barak, of Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, and of air force Commander Ido Nehushtan.
In order to deploy batteries for Sderot's defense, the IAF top brass would have to define this as an "operative demand." That has not happened, a failure Dori blames on the lack of attention paid by the IAF commander to anyone who is not a pilot and anything that is not an aircraft. In other words, the anti-aircraft batteries and the defense of Sderot are not exactly at the top of the air force commander's list of priorities. The one individual who should be able to see the entire picture and promote a change is Defense Minister Barak.
Two months ago there was a sense that Barak had finally seen the light and understood that there was a ready solution to the problem of defending Sderot and the Negev - that he had realized that he had been taken on a wild goose chase. All he needs to do is instruct the chief of staff and the air force commander to define the area's defense as "an operative need." Back then, Barak promised close aides that during his visit to Washington, he would discuss the possibility of bringing at least one Vulcan system to Israel, to examine its capabilities.
But it turns out that talk is one thing, and deeds, another. For now, the residents of Sderot and the Negev communities, currently enjoying the calm bestowed by the cease-fire with Hamas, will continue to be the victims of indecision, bureaucracy, and considerations that seem to be based on conflicts of interest.
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